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Abstract
We present a policy and process framework for secure environments for produc-
tive data science research projects at scale, by combining prevailing data security
threat and risk profiles into five sensitivity tiers, and, at each tier, specifying recom-
mended policies for data classification, data ingress, software ingress, data egress,
user access, user device control, and analysis environments. By presenting design
patterns for security choices for each tier, and using software defined infrastructure
so that a different, independent, secure research environment can be instantiated
for each project appropriate to its classification, we hope to maximise researcher
productivity and minimise risk, allowing research organisations to operate with con-
fidence.
∗Corresponding author: jhetherington@turing.ac.uk
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1 Introduction
1.1 Scope
Secure environments for analysis of sensitive datasets are
essential for research.
Such “data safe havens” are a vital part of the research
infrastructure. It is essential that sensitive or confidential
datasets are kept secure, both to comply with legal and
contractual requirements and to retain the confidence and
consent of data providers to continue to make their data
available for use in research. Of particular importance is
the capability to make use of personal data in a manner
that is compliant with data protection law, and to avoid
harm to the consent of society for research activities with
personal data (called ‘social license’).
To create and operate these environments safely and ef-
ficiently, whilst ensuring usability, requires, as with many
socio-technical systems, a complex stack of interacting
business process and design choices. Well-understood
standards for organisations to follow exist at many levels
of this stack, but we believe an important piece is miss-
ing. This paper therefore seeks to help the research e-
Infrastructure community reach a new consensus on the
further specific choices that need to be made when build-
ing and managing environments for productive, secure,
collaborative research projects.
We propose choices for the security controls that should
be applied in the areas of:
• data classification
• data ingress
• data egress
• software ingress
• user access
• user device management
• analysis environments
We do this for each of a small set of security “Tiers” - not-
ing that the choice of security controls depends on the
sensitivity of the data.
We acknowledge we are excluding a number of important
areas that do need to be considered, so as to create a man-
ageable body of work.
We do not cover the fundamental organisational security
practices necessary for any organisation outside research
(such as the NCSC’s Cyberessentials Plus [1]). Nor do we
cover the data-centre level or organisational management
security practices which are fundamental to any secure
computing facility. These are each essential areas of guid-
ance. We will assume these good practices are followed,
and that an organisation already has access to a secure
ISO 27001 [2] compliant data centre, robust governance
processes, and fundamental security practices for business
technology.
A data facility provides persistent access to one or more se-
cure datasets, and the compute needed to analyse them,
over multiple projects and long periods of time. This chal-
lenge, faced by libraries, cohort studies, and experimental
facilities, is an essential one also to address, but it is not
the challenge addressed here.
Lastly, we do not in this paper cover the “how”: how do
we actually build such an environment, constructing it
from software configuration files, firewall rules and so on?
Our current reference implementation based on Microsoft
Azure will be the subject of a future paper.
1.2 Approach
1.2.1 Secure data science
Secure, productive environments for research must be co-
designed by the research community and e-Infrastructure
professionals. A clear understanding of the requirements
will help to avoid adversarial approaches, between those
who feel greatest the pain of lost research productivity,
and those who bear the risk of breach. This paper seeks to
encourage a collaborative approach, building a common
understanding of the framework within which usability-
security trade-offs are made.
We highlight three assumptions about the research user
community critical to our design:
Firstly, we must consider not only accidental breach and
deliberate attack, but also the possibility of ‘workaround
breach’, where well-intentioned researchers, in an appar-
ent attempt to make their scholarly processes easier, cir-
cumvent security measures, for example by copying out
datasets to their personal device. This may happen where
users regard such security measures as barriers to over-
come rather than necessary processes, for example due to
institutional "security fatigue" resulting from unnecessar-
ily restrictive or ineffectual security measures. Our user
community is relatively technically able, so the casual use
of technical circumvention measures, not by adversaries
but by colleagues, must be considered. This can be miti-
gated by increasing awareness and placing inconvenience
barriers in the way of undesired behaviours, even if those
barriers are in principle not too hard to circumvent, and
by educational interventions, such as through requiring
users to read appropriate data handling training materi-
als as part of the access process. Security measures should
be appropriate to the sensitivity of the data, so that users
understand the purpose of the measures and how they re-
late to their personal responsibilities.
Secondly, research institutions need to be open about the
research we carry out, and hence, the datasets we hold.
This is because of both the need to publish our research as
part of our impact cases to funders, and the need to main-
tain the trust of society, which provides our social licence.
This means we cannot rely on “security through obscu-
rity”: we must make our security decisions assuming that
adversaries know what we have, what we are doing with
it, and how we secure it.
Thirdly, academic users have a high degree of cultural au-
tonomy. Institutional policies are never perfectly followed
in the highly distributed and open cultures necessary for
research creativity. We believe we are morally responsible
for breaches occurring as a result of researchers choosing
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not to use our facilities, despite organisational policies re-
quiring them to do so. Thus, in providing a highly usable
facility, nudging researchers to choose to use a shared se-
cure environment, we reduce the opportunity for harm.
1.2.2 Why Classify?
One of the major drivers for usability or security problems
is over- or under-classification, that is, treating data as
more or less sensitive than it deserves.
Regulatory and commercial compliance requirements
place constraints on the use of datasets. Implementation
of that compliance must be set in the context of the threat
and risk profile and balanced with researcher productivity.
Almost all security measures can be circumvented, se-
curity can almost always be improved by adding addi-
tional barriers, and improvements to security almost al-
ways carry a cost in usability and performance.
Miss-classification is seriously costly for research organ-
isations: over-classification results not just in lost re-
searcher productivity, but also a loss of scientific en-
gagement, as researchers choose not to take part in a
project with cumbersome security requirements. System-
atic over-classification increases data risk by encouraging
workaround breach.
The risks of under-classification include not only legal
and financial sanction, but the loss of the social li-
cence to operate to the whole community of data science
researchers[3].
1.2.3 Software-defined infrastructure
Our approach - separately instantiating an isolated envi-
ronment for each project - is made feasible by the advent
of “software defined infrastructure”.
It is now possible to specify a whole arrangement of IT
infrastructure, servers, storage, access policies and so on,
completely as code. This code is executed against web
services provided by infrastructure providers (the APIs of
cloud providers such as Microsoft, Amazon or Google, or
an in-house “private cloud” using a technology such as
OpenStack [4]), and the infrastructure instantiated.
This paper assumes the availability of a software-
defined infrastructure provision offering, in an ISO27001-
compliant data-centre and organisation, supporting the
scripted instantiation of virtual machines, storage, and se-
cure virtual networks.
One of the key pieces of functionality needed to support a
data safe haven is “Identification, Authorisation and Au-
thentication” (IAA). This is a complex part of the system
that is critical to get right and we recommend relying on
existing proven implementations. Many software-defined
infrastructure offerings provide IAA as a service and we
would suggest using this where available.
Our view is that a software-defined infrastructure plat-
form, on which to build, is a requirement for a well-
defined secure research environment. It allows for separa-
tion of concerns between core IT services and the research
e-Infrastructure community. It also means that the defi-
nition of the environment can be meaningfully audited -
with as many aspects as possible of it described formally
in code, it can be more fully scrutinised.
Given this, the topic of this paper is how best to assemble
the pieces afforded by such services into a secure, scal-
able, productive research environment.
In this document, we do so at a high level, describing
in general terms what should be built, and in particular,
what restrictions should be applied at which tiers. In the
followup reference implementation paper, we will give
a detailed description of a reference implementation on
the Microsoft Azure public cloud, and publish the scripts
themselves.
Note that the use of a public cloud is not the critical
aspect. The assumption is only the presence of a pro-
grammable software defined infrastructure. Whether the
use of third-party data centre providers is admissible for
sensitive data is a matter of some debate within the com-
munity, and our task in this paper is independent of that
debate. Other work at the Turing Institute, notably the
MARU project [5], addresses some of these concerns.
1.2.4 Software defined management pro-
cesses
How do we make our business processes software defined,
so that the same code-level scrutiny can be made of the
processes that govern our activities as for the definition of
the infrastructure?
Our recommendation is to manage all the tasks that take
place (user management, project creation, environment
classification, environment instantiation, data and soft-
ware ingress and egress, and more), within a web-based
application, backed by a persistent database.
This application can then drive actions within the
software-defined infrastructure layer. The app should
take actions on behalf of the user, utilising the users’ au-
thorisations to the infrastructure layer - for security and
audit reasons the management app should have no autho-
risations of its own. To provide a strict separation of con-
cerns between operations at the infrastructure level and
operations within the deployed infrastructure, we recom-
mend that user accounts with authorisation to deploy and
amend infrastructure are kept separate from those used
to administer systems deployed within the infrastructure.
The management application provides a convenient view
on data stored within that infrastructure, abstracting the
complexity of those interfaces.
Metadata regarding projects, their membership etc, is
business data about the projects, (not the research
datasets, the subject matter of the research), and its se-
curity management processes should be governed by an
institution’s prevailing business data protection policies,
which are not the subject of this paper.
1.3 Prior Work
Here, we are going to review some of the existing tech-
nologies and tools used to work with sensitive datasets.
When we refer to ‘sensitive’ data, we include data that is
commercially or government sensitive as well as personal
data.
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Researchers often create data storage and processing plat-
forms to support their own research, tailored towards the
needs of their research fields. Typically, such platforms
provide some level of data security but do not limit the
researchers’ access to the underlying data, making them
unsuitable for working directly with sensitive data from
third parties.
To accommodate this, dataset providers commonly use
on-site software to create a de-identified copy of the data
which is then transferred to the research institution. For
example, a medical imaging research project might utilise
widely-used software tools such as: CTP [6] to anonymise
the data; XNAT [7] to store the anonymised data; and
DAX [8] to run analysis pipelines on the data.
Such approaches provide processing flexibility but also
bring a number of drawbacks, such as:
• relying on a high level of confidence in the de-
identification process - this may fail if, for example,
personal identifiable information appears unexpect-
edly in free text fields or burnt into image data
• not addressing the possibility of data re-identification
from multiple dataset combination
• limiting the ability to audit the entire data processing
pipeline as an integrated system (due to the separa-
tion of the de-identification and processing systems,
which are installed at different institutions)
Additionally, self-hosted systems may be customised to
particular environments and designed without reference
to scalability and reusability of the software architec-
ture. This makes them unsuitable for supporting the
widespread application of rigorous methods to establish
secure environments.
Secure research environments
There are presently a number of research environments
which offer appropriate levels of security to handle sensi-
tive data. The UK Secure eResearch Platform (UKSeRP),
which was developed by the Farr Institute [9] and is now
run by Swansea University. The platform allows data
owners to upload and set access controls for their data.
Significantly for this paper, a new UKSeRP can be in-
stantiated on request, scaled to the needs of individual
projects [10]. A UKSeRP powers the Dementias Platform
UK [11], a collaborative secure environment run in a vir-
tual desktop – meaning that data is not transferred to the
users, and cannot be erased from the virtual desktop.
The Farr Institute also established the network of Safe
Havens used by NHS Scotland, with secure access points
to both national and regional havens and remote ac-
cess granted via VPN to trusted researchers. The
havens operate in a federated network, with support
and co-ordination provided by a single point of contact:
eDRIS (the electronic Data and Research Innovation Ser-
vice) [12].
Public Good projects can use the UK Data Service’s Secure
Lab, which uses a Citrix VPN to allow physical and remote
access from within the UK and prevents any download of
data [13]. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) oper-
ates a Secure Research Service for approved researchers,
with access points within government organisations and
in physical ONS ‘Safe Settings’, with plans to increase op-
portunities for remote access [14]. Similar secure data
schemes are operated by other national governments,
such as the German Research Data Centre at the Institut
für Arbeitsmarkt (IAB) [15] and the French Centre d’accès
sécurisé aux données (CASD) [16]. These schemes, along
with others including the UK Data Service, are part of the
International Data Access Network (IDAN) [17]. Estab-
lishing agreements to allow remote access to international
data in these schemes is a stated aim of the ONS, making
a co-ordinated approach a priority.
SaaS examples of secure data platforms include
data.world [18], which allows data owners to up-
load data and maintain strict control over access levels
governing the security of work in the platform. Analytix-
agility by Aridhia [19] similarly provides a collaborative
environment with a role-based permissions model and
managed data export.
Additionally, many big data platforms based on Hadoop
technology make use of frameworks that allow granu-
lar access to monitor and control data [20]. Products
such as SDX by Cloudera [21] offer an integrated envi-
ronment that assures data governance and security, in-
cluding the capability to suppress sensitive data [22]. Mi-
crosoft Azure utilizes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
and has published a blueprint for organisations to manip-
ulate sensitive data in compliance with American HIPAA
and HITRUST regulations [23].
There are also platforms to support collaborative research
which don’t have the full functionality of secure research
environments, but which conform to similar standards.
For example, the open source DataSHIELD software al-
lows researchers to analyse data without it leaving its
home environment, offering a workaround enabling col-
laborative research on sensitive data [24]. The Beacon
Project established by ELIXIR and the Global Alliance for
Genomics and Health (GA4GH) has developed a sharing
platform which allows secure data upload and enables
users to make queries of datasets and receive yes/no re-
sponses [25]. The establishment of a tiered access system
paves the way for this to become a secure research envi-
ronment in the future.
Existing frameworks and standards
All of the solutions described comply with ISOs 27001 [2]
and 27002 [26], and those which handle personal data
in the EU must meet the requirements of the EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [27]. Platforms
which handle NHS data must meet the ten high-level se-
curity standards set by the National Data Guardian for
Health and Social Care [28]. Compliance against these
standards can be checked using the Data Security and Pro-
tection Toolkit published by NHS Digital [29].
Safe Havens within NHS Scotland’s federated network
must comply with the Scottish Government’s Safe Havens
Charter [30]. As well as stipulations for operating and
hosting a Safe Haven, the charter sets out some technical
requirements such as the need for 2fa and an audit log for
secure access points, but doesn’t provide technical guid-
ance on the establishment of secure environments. The
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charter in turn is informed by the Guiding Principles for
Data Linkage published by the Scottish Government [31].
The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH)
maintains a suite of technical standards for sharing ge-
nomic and health related data [32]; this includes the API
for the Beacon project discussed above. These fit within
their Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and
Health-Related Data [33].
A recent addition to the GA4GH standards is Data Use
Ontology (DUO) [34], a system to standardize the terms
used to classify health data according to their use and
therefore restrictions on usage [35]. This has similar aims
to the DataTags system developed by Harvard Univer-
sity [36]. Both systems for data tagging would map to
a tiered model of environments for data access.
While there are a number of frameworks and standards
for sharing secure data, we were unable to find detailed
technical guidance on establishing secure research envi-
ronments, particularly with regards to treatment of data
ingress and egress at different tiers.
Finally, careful considerations are also required when
analysis outputs are extracted from secure environments
prior to subsequent dissemination in academic or official
publications. Practical recommendations have been pro-
vided by Eurostat — the statistical office of the European
Union [37]. These cover both descriptive statistics (such
as frequency tables) as well as the output of standard sta-
tistical models (such as linear regression). However, to
the best of our knowledge, there are currently no guide-
lines for output checking in the context of more complex
statistical and machine learning methods, such as random
forests.
The book The Anonymisation Decision-Making Frame-
work [38] and article Functional Anonymisation: Per-
sonal Data and the Data Environment [39] provide very
useful frameworks to think about anonymisation and
pseudonymisation.
2 A model for secure data research
projects
Figure 1 describes our model for secure data research.
2.1 Overview
2.2 Work Packages and Projects
Assessing the sensitivity of a dataset requires an under-
standing of the base sensitivity of the information con-
tained in the dataset and of the impact on that base sensi-
tivity of the operations that it will undergo in the research
project. The classification exercise therefore relates to
each stage of a project and not simply to the datasets as
they are introduced into it.
Classification to a tier is therefore not a property of a
dataset, because a particular dataset’s sensitivity depends
on the data it can be combined with, and the use to
which it is put. Nor is it a constant across a project -
many projects will begin with identifiable data, and then
anonymise it, for example.
In our model, projects are divided into work packages,
which we use here to refer to the activities carried out
within a distinct phase of work carried out as part of a
project, with a specific outcome in mind. A work package
can make use of one or more datasets, and includes an
idea of the analysis which the research team intends to
carry out, the potential outputs they are expecting, and
the tools they intend to use - all important factors affecting
the data sensitivity.
Classification should be carried out on the work packages
rather than individual datasets. At their first interaction
with a Dataset Provider, the research team may only have
some idea of how they intend to use the dataset, so we
outline the procedures for initial classification of individ-
ual datasets in section 4.1.1.
When a full classification is carried out, Dataset Providers
should have a full understanding of any datasets that will
be combined and what analysis is intended. This consti-
tutes a work package, even if only one dataset is being
classified. If multiple datasets are combined in one work
package, a representative from each Dataset Provider will
need to agree the classification.
For more information on the classification process, see
section 4.1 below.
2.3 Environments and Platforms
Once a work package has been classified, an appropriate
secure research environment is instantiated depending on
the tier assigned.
A project will create one environment for each work pack-
age, and will create work packages as required, corre-
sponding to the stages of the project and the current tasks
in operation.
Depending on the classification assigned, a work package
may instantiate its environment on one of several Plat-
forms. For example, the management system may allow
instantiation of environments both on the public cloud
or an on-premises private infrastructure, or on a remote
HPC cluster. Each of these Platforms may host an environ-
ment, and each should be integrated appropriately with
the management framework.
2.4 Datasets
In our model, datasets only have sensitivity assigned as
part of work packages. Even one dataset on its own
should be classified as a work package with the proposed
analysis and potential outputs taken into account. A
dataset can be analysed in multiple environments if it is
included in multiple work packages, but each work pack-
age must be classified separately.
When a second project makes use of a dataset already
used by a previous project, it is part of a new work package
which must be separately classified from scratch. When a
project ends, after egress of any reclassified data outputs,
its datasets are deleted.
This illustrates our choice to focus on the design of envi-
ronments for research projects, not a persistent data fa-
cility or data trust [40]. In future, the relation between
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Figure 1. Entity relationship diagram for secure data research.
environments and datasets must become many-many, to
allow for data facilities.
2.5 Researcher
A project member, who analyses data to produce results.
We reserve the capitalised term “Researcher” for this role
in our user model. We use the lower case term when con-
sidering the population of researchers more widely.
2.6 Investigator
The research project lead, this individual is responsible for
ensuring that the project staff comply with the environ-
ment’s security policies. Although multiple Researchers
will take part in the project, we recommend that a single
lead Investigator is accountable to the research institution
for a project. Multiple collaborating institutions may have
their own lead academic staff, and academic staff might
delegate to a Researcher the leadership as far as interac-
tion with the environment is concerned. In both cases, the
term Investigator here is independent of this - regardless
of academic status or institutional collaboration, this indi-
vidual accepts moral responsibility for the conduct of the
project and its members. (Although legally the research
institution retains liability.)
2.7 Referee
A Referee volunteers to review code or data as it brought
into or out of an environment, providing evidence to the
Investigator and Dataset Provider Representative that the
research team is complying with data handling practices.
Referees also play a vital role in classifying work packages
at Tiers 2 and above. This is particularly important when
output data from an analysis environment is classified as
a new work package at a different tier.
The importance of an independent Referee for sensitive
data handling is discussed further in section 10.
2.8 Dataset Provider and Representative
The Dataset Provider is the organisation which provided
a dataset under analysis. The Dataset Provider will des-
ignate a single representative contact to liaise with the
research institution.
This individual is the Dataset Provider Representative.
They are authorised to act on behalf of the Dataset
Provider with respect to the dataset and must be in a po-
sition to certify that the Dataset Provider is authorised to
share the dataset with the research institute, and know
whether any further GDPR consent [27] or other permis-
sions grants are required.
The web management interface will be used to manage
any transitions of this responsibility between personnel
at the Dataset Provider.
Dataset Provider Representatives must be given accounts
within the research institute’s system to monitor the use
to which their datasets are put and the process of data
classification, ingress, and egress.
There may be additional people at the Dataset Provider
who will have input in discussions around data shar-
ing and data classification. It is the duty of the Dataset
Provider Representative to manage this set of stakehold-
ers at the Dataset Provider.
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When a work package is classified, this may include mul-
tiple datasets, which may come from different providers.
When this is the case, each Dataset Provider will require
its own Dataset Provider Representative.
Each of these Dataset Provider Representatives should be
involved in classifying the work package that their dataset
is used in. They will need to have not only an understand-
ing of the content of their dataset, but an understanding
of the datasets it will be combined with, and the analysis
the Researchers intend to carry out.
All Dataset Provider Representatives whose data forms
part of a work package will need to come to the same
consensus on the tier used to analyse that work package
in order for the project to proceed.
2.9 Programme Manager
A designated staff member in the research institution who
is responsible for creating and monitoring projects and
environments and overseeing a portfolio of projects. This
should be a member of professional staff with oversight
for data handling in one or more research domains.
The Programme Manager can add new users to the sys-
tem, and assign users to specific projects. They assign
Project Managers and can, if they wish, take on this role
themselves.
2.10 Project Manager
A staff member with responsibility for running a partic-
ular project. This role could be filled by the Programme
Manager, or a different nominated member of staff within
the research institution.
While the Programme Manager should maintain respon-
sibility for adding users to the user list, and can add users
to projects, the Project Manager should also have the au-
thority to assign existing users to their project. To do this
they will need to be able to view and search existing users.
2.11 System Manager
A member of staff responsible for configuration and main-
tenance of the secure research environment. They also
manage the secure platforms on which environments are
instantiated.
3 Environment Tiers
Our recommendation for secure information processing
tiers is based on work which has gone before. We have
begun with the UK government classifications [41] as a
base, and reconciled these to the definitions of personal
data, whether or not something is ’special category’ un-
der the GDPR [27] or relates to criminal convictions, and
related them to common activities in the research com-
munity.
Where input datasets contain personal data, considera-
tion should always be given at the outset to minimis-
ing the personal data, including by pseudonymisation or
anonymisation.
Pseudonymised data is still personal data, as it can be re-
identified by those who hold the key to turn pseudonyms
back into individual identifiers. Note that this may in-
clude synthetic data derived from personal data, or mod-
els trained on personal data, depending on the methods
used to synthesise the data or generate the models.
Anonymised data, including pseudonymised data where
that key is destroyed, is not personal data when it is im-
possible to re-identify any living individual from it. How-
ever, if the quality of anonymisation is ambiguous or if
individuals can be identified when the anonymised data
is combined with another dataset, there is still a dan-
ger of personal information being revealed. Such data
would by definition not be anonymised, and would there-
fore be personal data. The GDPR [27] and ICO guid-
ance [42]make this clear. The question as to whether such
re-identification is possible or not is a very subtle one, and
the assessment of this risk is critical to the assignment of
security tiers.
We emphasise that data classification is based on con-
sidering the sensitivity of all information handled in the
project, including information generated by combining or
processing input datasets. In every case, the categorisa-
tion does not depend only on the input datasets, but on
combining information with other information or gener-
ated results. We refer to the combination of this informa-
tion as a work package, which is defined in section 2.2
above.
Derived information may be of higher security tier than
the information in the input datasets (for example, in-
formation on the identities of those who are suspected
to possess an un-diagnosed neurological condition on the
basis of analysis of public social media data.) This should
form part of the information constituting a work package;
when a project team believes this will be the case, they
should make this clear to the Dataset Provider Represen-
tative, and the work package should be classified at the
higher tier of secure environment.
If it becomes apparent during the project that intended
analysis will produce this effect then the inputs should be
treated as a new work package with this extra informa-
tion, and classified afresh, following the full classification
process below.
In the following, “personal data” follows the GDPR [27]
definition: information from which a living individual is
identified or identifiable. It excludes information about
individuals who are dead.
3.1 Tier 0
Tier 0 environments are used to handle publicly available,
open information, where all generated and combined in-
formation is also suitable for open handling.
Tier 0 applies where none of the information processed,
combined or generated includes personal data, commer-
cially sensitive data, or data which will have legal, politi-
cal or reputational consequences in the event of unautho-
rised disclosure.
Tier 0 data should be considered ready for publication.
Although this data is open, there are still advantages to
handling it through a managed data analysis infrastruc-
ture.
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Management of Tier 0 datasets in a visible, well-ordered
infrastructure provides confidence to stakeholders as to
the handling of more sensitive datasets.
Although analysis may take place on personal devices, the
datasets should still therefore be listed through the inven-
tory and curatorial systems of a managed research data
environment.
Finally, audit trails as to the handling of Tier 0 datasets
reduce risks associated with misclassification - if data is
mistakenly classified as lower tier than it should be, we
still retain information as to how it was processed during
the period of misclassification.
3.2 Tier 1
Tier 1 environments are used to handle, process and gen-
erate data that is intended for eventual publication or that
could be published without reputational damage.
Information is kept private in order to give the research
team a competitive advantage, not due to legal data pro-
tection requirements.
Both the datasets and the proposed processing must oth-
erwise meet the criteria for Tier 0.
It may be used for anonymised or synthetic information
generated from personal data, where one has absolute
confidence in the quality of anonymisation. This makes
the information no longer personal data. This does not
include pseudonymised data which can be re-identified
in combination with a key or other dataset. Please refer
to the definitions above.
It may also be used for commercial data where commer-
cial consequences of disclosure would be no impact or
very low impact, with the agreement of all parties.
3.3 Tier 2
Tier 2 environments are used to handle, combine or gen-
erate information which is not linked to personal data.
It may be used for pseudonymised or synthetic infor-
mation generated from personal data, where classifiers
have strong confidence in the quality of pseudonymisa-
tion. The risk of processing it so that individuals are ca-
pable of being re-identified must be considered as part of
the classification process.
The pseudonymisation or anonymisation process itself, if
carried out in the research organisation, should take place
in a Tier 3 environment. See section 4.1.5 for a full dis-
cussion of audit of pseudonymisation or anonymisation
code.
A typical model for a project handling personal data will
be to instantiate both Tier 2 and Tier 3 environments, with
pseudonymised or synthetic data generated in the Tier 3
environment and then transferred to the Tier 2 environ-
ment.
Tier 2 environments are also used to handle, combine or
generate information which is confidential, but not, in
commercial or national security terms, sensitive. This in-
cludes commercial-in-confidence datasets or intellectual
property where the legal, commercial, political and rep-
utational consequences from disclosure are low. Where
such consequences are not low, Tier 3 should be used.
At Tier 2, the most significant risks are ‘workaround
breach‘ and the risk of mistakenly believing data is
anonymised, when in fact re-identification might be pos-
sible.
Tier 2 corresponds to the government OFFICIAL classifi-
cation.
3.4 Tier 3
Tier 3 environments are used to handle, combine or gen-
erate personal data, other than personal data where there
is a risk that disclosure might pose a substantial threat to
the personal safety, health or security of the data subjects
(which would be Tier 4).
It includes pseudonymised or synthetic information gen-
erated from personal data, where the classifier has only
weak confidence in the quality of pseudonymisation.
Tier 3 environments are also used to handle, com-
bine or generate information, including commercial-in-
confidence information and intellectual property, which is
sensitive in commercial, legal, political or national secu-
rity terms. This tier anticipates the need to defend against
compromise by attackers with bounded capabilities and
resources. This may include hacktivists, single-issue pres-
sure groups, investigative journalists, competent individ-
ual hackers and the majority of criminal individuals and
groups. The threat profile excludes sophisticated, well-
resourced and determined threat actors, making targeted
attacks, such as highly capable serious organised crime
groups and state actors. This corresponds to the govern-
mental ‘OFFICIAL–SENSITIVE’ descriptor. [41]
The difference between Tier 2 and Tier 3 environments
is the most significant in this model, both for researcher
productivity and organisational risk.
At Tier 3, the risk of hostile actors attempting to break
into the secure environment becomes significant.
3.5 Tier 4
Tier 4 environments are used to handle, combine or gen-
erate personal data where disclosure poses a substantial
threat to the personal safety, health or security of the data
subjects.
This also includes handling, combining or generating
datasets which are sensitive in commercial or national se-
curity terms, and are likely to be subject to attack by so-
phisticated, well-resourced and determined actors, such
as serious organised crime groups and state actors. This
tier corresponds to the UK government ‘SECRET’ categori-
sation [41].
It is at Tier 4 that the risk of hostile actors penetrating the
project team becomes significant.
4 Data lifecycle
4.1 The Classification Process
We now describe a recommended process through which
research activities with data of any degree of sensitivity
are classified.
We envisage that classification discussions will be ongoing
between the research team and Dataset Providers whose
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data is included in a work package (see section 2.2).
Rather than a decision taken at a point in time, classi-
fication should be viewed as an ongoing question which
should be revisited in response to new knowledge about
the data, or changes to the plans of the research team.
That said, there will need to be decision points at which
all parties agree that data can be ingressed into an en-
vironment at a particular security tier. For this purpose,
we have designed a flowchart (Figure 2) which should be
used to classify work packages at these points, and which
should be embedded in the management framework to
record results.
We anticipate that there will be five approximate stages
to the data classification process, outlined below:
• Dataset Providers and research teams hold initial
conversations about the sensitivity of a work pack-
age - that is, a set of research activities involving the
dataset (section 2.2), using the flowchart in Figure 2
to guide the conversation.
• During these conversations, the work package is
given an initial preliminary classification that all par-
ties are confident is equal to or higher than the true
classification of the work package.
• An environment is then instantiated at the prelim-
inary tier and the dataset ingressed into it to pro-
vide the Investigator with the complete information
on which to base a final classification.
• At some point after this, all classifiers (the Investiga-
tor, Dataset Provider Representative and a Referee if
necessary) go through the flowchart in Figure 2 and
agree on a final classification for the work package.
Analysis can only start once classification is agreed.
• The dataset will either stay in the initial environment
environment or be ingressed into a new environment
at a different tier.
• If, after this, anything changes such as new knowl-
edge about the dataset, the intended analysis chang-
ing, or the research team wanting to ingress a new
dataset to combine with the existing one, this creates
a new work package which must be classified afresh
by all classifiers.
• If the classification tier resulting from this process dif-
fers from that of the existing environment, the exist-
ing dataset and any output of the work package must
be transferred to a new environment of the appropri-
ate tier, following the data egress process outlined in
section 4.1.5.
4.1.1 Initial Classification
During initial classification conversations, the research
team will not have access to the dataset, so their judg-
ment will be limited.
For this reason, we recommend that at some point during
these initial discussions, the dataset is ingressed into a
Tier 3 environment to which the Investigator has access,
so that they have complete information on which to base
full classification.
We recommend a Tier 3 environment as most datasets will
be Tier 3 or lower, and ingressing into a Tier 3 environ-
ment initially is therefore erring on the side of caution.
We recommend that this is done even when the Dataset
Provider believes the data should be classified at Tier 0,
Tier 1 or Tier 2, as the risk of ove-classifying initially be-
fore instantiating a lower-tier environment are lower than
the risks of under-classifying at this stage.
The exception to this should be where any party feels
there is a possibility that data may be Tier 4 (see Figure 2).
In this case, all parties should reconsider whether to pro-
ceed with the project, and the research team should work
with the Dataset Provider to establish the legal sensitivity
of the data before performing any ingress.
4.1.2 Full Classification Process
After the initial ingress of data to a Tier 3 environment,
the Investigator and the Dataset Provider Representative
should carry out full classification before proceeding with
the project.
A central premise which defines our approach to classifi-
cation is that datasets should not be classified in isolation
but as part of a work package. This is a term we use to
refer to the datasets and activities involved in a distinct
phase of work carried out as part of a project, with a spe-
cific outcome in mind.
A work package can be made up of one or more datasets,
and includes, in addition to the data, an idea of the anal-
ysis which the research team intends to carry out, the po-
tential outputs they are expecting, and the tools they in-
tend to use - all important factors affecting the sensitivity
of the data.
If the research team only intends to analyse one dataset,
they should communicate to the Dataset Provider how
they intend to analyse the data and what outputs they
are expecting. With knowledge of this intended use, the
Dataset Provider Representative should assess which clas-
sification tier they recommend for the data by answering
the questions set out in the flowchart below (Figure 2).
The project Investigator should separately go through this
process once they have access to the data in a Tier 3 en-
vironment. If the data is likely to be Tier 2 or higher, we
additionally recommend appointing an independent Ref-
eree to provide their opinion (See 10).
The project should only proceed if the Investigator, the
Dataset Provider Representative, and the Referee if appli-
cable, can come to a consensus for which tier the dataset
should be classified at. Where disagreements occur over
which classification tier to apply, the management system
should notify the users, who should attempt to reach con-
sensus.
If consensus cannot be reached, the Investigator should
seriously reconsider whether to proceed with the project
- the risks associated with projects where there is not con-
sensus as to data handling between the Dataset Provider
and research team are significant. In the event that the
project will proceed in the absence of consensus over clas-
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sification, the highest tier proposed should apply. Alter-
natively, the Dataset Provider may wish for their dataset
to be removed from the system if consensus cannot be
reached - if this is the case, the storage volumes (see sec-
tion 5.5) should be deleted.
Once the work package has been classified, a new envi-
ronment should be instantiated at the appropriate tier, un-
less it has been classified at Tier 3, in which case analysis
can begin in the existing environment. In either case, no
analysis should begin until all classifiers have agreed on
the classification, and this agreement is recorded in the
system.
If, at any point during the project, the research team de-
cides to analyse the data differently or for a different pur-
pose than previously agreed, this constitutes a new work
package, and should be newly classified by repeating this
process. This is also the case if the team wishes to ingress
another dataset in combination with the existing one, spe-
cific recommendations for which are laid out below.
4.1.3 Combining Multiple Datasets
Researchers may want to combine two or more datasets
and analyse them together in the same environment. It
is important that any classification of a dataset takes into
account the data it will be used in combination with, as
this could change the sensitivity by, for example, making
data easier to de-anonymize. For this reason, we lay out
specific recommendations for classifying datasets in com-
bination below.
If the research team knows that they will analyse datasets
in combination, they should begin by ingressing them sep-
arately into their own Tier 3 environments.
The work package on which full classification is carried
out will consist of each dataset they intend to combine, in
addition to information about the intended analysis and
expected results. The research team should communicate
to each Dataset Provider as much detail as is appropriate
about the other datasets their data will be combined with.
A Dataset Provider Representative from each of the com-
bined datasets should then separately go through the clas-
sification questions in Figure 2, as well as the Investigator
and a Referee if necessary. Consensus from each party,
including all Dataset Provider Representatives, is needed
before moving on. Once consensus has been reached, a
new environment should be established at the agreed tier
and the datasets ingressed into it.
To combine a new dataset with a work package that has
already been classified, the process followed should be
substantially the same, as this would create a new work
package separate to the one that had previously been clas-
sified. As above, the research team should communicate
to each Dataset Provider detail about the other dataset(s)
their data will be in combination with, and go through
the full classification process from the start. If the classi-
fication tier decided upon, taking into account new data
added, is the same as the existing work package, the new
dataset may be added to the existing environment. If
not, this is a new work package, and a new environment
should be instantiated to carry out the combined analysis.
If the research team intends to combine multiple datasets
in future, but wish to begin analysis on one dataset, they
should include details about any intended future combi-
nation as part of the initial work package, and this should
be taken into account when classifying. In this case, it
is possible that the research team could introduce a pre-
viously agreed dataset at a later stage without revisiting
the classification process. However, even in this case, we
recommend that new datasets go through the classifica-
tion process, in case the Dataset Provider’s position has
changed.
4.1.4 Data egress and new classification
The initial classification of a work package will often be
for the purpose of ingress into an initial high-tier envi-
ronment to carry out anonymisation, pseudonymisation
or synthetic data generation work, with the intention of
making the data appropriate for treatment in a lower-tier
environment.
Researchers may equally want to conduct analysis on out-
put data from a previously analysed dataset if they believe
it would be useful to continue the research.
It is a central premise of our model that any output data is
classified as a new work package, separate from the work
package that it is derived from.
Any data which is intended to be removed from an anal-
ysis environment results in the creation of a new work
package and the full classification process should be fol-
lowed, whether for the purposes of publishing output data
(in which case the output data must be Tier 1 or Tier 0), or
analysing it in a new environment. As with the initial clas-
sification, the Dataset Provider Representatives for each
dataset included in the work package need to agree with
the classification, along with the Investigator.
As a convenience, if the resulting derived data is in a form
which has been agreed with Dataset Provider Representa-
tives at the initial classification stage – for example, a sum-
mary statistic which was the intended output for analysis
of a sensitive dataset - then this re-classification may be
pre-approved.
In this case, Investigators may consult an independent
Referee and classify the work package without returning
to the Dataset Provider Representative, if they have high
confidence that the outputs are as anticipated during the
initial classification.
We recommend that, whenever data egress is conducted
with the intent of establishing a new environment for fur-
ther research, a Referee is consulted to ensure balance
(see Section 10).
In all cases, classification of a work package at the point
of egress should be done with all parties fully aware of
the analytical processes which created the derived data
from the initial work package – and these should be fully
reproducible.
In most cases, this will necessitate an executable script
describing, in code, the processes used. The authors do
not believe that a spreadsheet can be properly audited for
this. This script should be provided so that those classi-
fying the output data can understand and verify how the
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output data was generated from the more sensitive work
package dataset.
After the full classification process has been followed, a
new environment can be created with the former volume
used for data egress now mounted as a new secure data
volume within a new environment, at a different tier (see
section 5.5). The existence of this environment as a ”de-
rived environment” should be noted, with the originating
environment’s ID and the analysis script preserved.
Common examples here are the classification of a neural
network trained on sensitive data, or the development of
a statistically similar synthetic dataset. The question as
to whether these can leak personal information from the
training set is a very subtle one: hence our recommen-
dation of expert peer review and consultation with the
original Dataset Provider(s).
Similar considerations apply to the creation of derived
datasets by sampling from a larger dataset - while not of
lower GDPR sensitivity, these can often be of lower com-
mercial sensitivity, justifying a different tier. The same
classification process should be followed as above and
noted on the original DPIA.
4.1.5 Publishing or returning data
If it is agreed that the output data work package can be
classified as Tier 1 or Tier 0 and published, an appropriate
environment at this tier should be created, and data can
be copied out directly via Secure Copy Protocol (SCP).
As an exceptional process, it may be necessary to re-
lease generated sensitive data back to the original Dataset
Provider, or to transfer to an independent secure data en-
vironment.
In this circumstance, then the following process should be
followed:
The Dataset Provider Representative and Programme
Manager should authorise this in the management sys-
tem, which makes record of the fact. The expected IP
range and time duration for the extraction should be spec-
ified at this time. This should temporarily make available
a new secure volume accessible outside the environment
using the credentials of the Dataset Provider Representa-
tive, from which data may be copied out.
4.1.6 Personal data handling
If personal data (see definition in section 4.2.1 below) is
handled or generated, the Programme Manager and the
Project Manager must verify that there is a fair, transpar-
ent and lawful basis both for the Dataset Provider to share
the information with the research institution and for the
research institution to use that information as planned in
the project. If the personal data were originally collected
on the basis of consent, fresh consent for use in the project
will usually be required. Note that this is a separate con-
sent specifically for the purposes of ensuring GDPR com-
pliance and should not be equated with any ethical con-
sent that may be necessary. If the personal data were orig-
inally collected on a lawful basis other than consent, it will
almost always be possible to use them in a research project
provided that adequate safeguards are in place. A Data
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) must be carried out
and the final version recorded in the management system,
and in data protection processing records of all relevant
organisations.
The use of personal data that is available on social media
or other websites is governed by the terms and conditions
of the relevant website and also by the laws of confidence,
privacy and data protection. It must not be assumed to be
free to use for a particular project without checking.
The project may need to be approved by an Ethics Ad-
visory Group before authorisation - the completion of
this process should also be recorded in the management
framework by the Project Manager.
4.1.7 Data Sharing Agreement
Any contractual terms regarding the datasets should be
added to the metadata for all datasets which have been
classified, including any additional commitments to be
made by Researchers on joining the project.
A template agreement with Dataset Providers normally
used by the research institution (ideally, already existing)
should be generated by the system before a dataset is in-
gressed to the initial Tier 3 environment. This should be
a formal data sharing agreement as required under data
protection law, and drafted with the benefit of legal ad-
vice.
After the full classification process is carried out, the
agreement may need to be updated. We recommend that
the wording of the initial agreement is such that it enables
research at the tier anticipated by the Dataset Provider, or
is worded flexibly enough that changes after the initial
classification are minimal.
The executed agreement itself, based on the template,
should be physically or digitally signed and stored within
a secure document volume (see section 5.5), with an in-
dex into it maintained within the database of the web
management tool. A copy of the agreement should be au-
tomatically stored in the same location as the dataset for
user reference when working with the data in the analysis
environment.
4.2 How to classify work packages
Figure 2 below shows a flowchart with the questions that
should be used to allocate a work package to one of the
security tiers.
These questions should be implemented as a series of di-
alogues within the management system.
Each person who is classifying the data should separately
go through this flowchart and make their own classifica-
tion – these are the Investigator, the Dataset Provider Rep-
resentative, and, if the data might be Tier 2 or above, an
independent Referee [see section 4.1 above].
If the Investigator and the Dataset Provider Representa-
tive disagree about the tier classification, they should find
a consensus before starting the project. This is partic-
ularly true in the case of commercial-in-confidence in-
formation, which should be treated as Tier 2 unless the
Dataset Provider Representative agrees it can be lower.
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Please note that the flowchart should only be used to as-
sess into what tier the work package should fall. It does
not include other actions researchers should take when
dealing with personal data, such as considering ways to
minimise the personal data they need to use.
4.2.1 Flowchart definitions
In the flowchart, the terms below are defined as follows:
Personal data is any information relating to an identified
or identifiable living individual (see below); an ’identi-
fiable’ living individual is one who can be identified, di-
rectly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an iden-
tifier such as a name, an identification number, location
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific
to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity of that natural person.
The term ’indirectly’ here indicates that this includes data
where identification is made possible by combining one
or more sets of data, including synthetic data or trained
models. See also section 4.1.6 above.
A Living individual is an individual for whom you do not
have reasonable evidence that they are deceased. If you’re
unsure if the data subject is alive or dead, assume they
have a lifespan of 100 years and act accordingly. If you’re
unsure of their age, assume 16 for any adult and 0 for any
child, unless you have contextual evidence that allows you
to make a reasonable assumption otherwise [43].
Pseudonymised data is personal data that has been pro-
cessed in such a manner that it can no longer be attributed
to a specific living individual without the use of additional
information, which is kept separately and subject to tech-
nical and organisational measures that ensure that the
personal data is not attributed to an identified or iden-
tifiable living individual.
Two important things to note are that pseudonymised
data:
• is still personal data. It becomes anonymised data,
and is no longer personal data, only if both the key
data connecting pseudonyms to real numbers is se-
curely destroyed, and no other data exists in the world
which could be used statistically to re-identify individ-
uals from the data.
• depending on the method used, it often includes syn-
thetic data and models that have been trained on per-
sonal data. Expert review is needed to determine the
degree to which such datasets could allow individu-
als to be identified. Such data should be treated as
pseudonymised data until such expert review is re-
ceived.
It is important that both researchers and Dataset Providers
consider the level of confidence they have in the likeli-
hood of identifying individuals from data.
Anonymised data is data which under no circumstances
can be used to identify an individual, and this is less com-
mon than many realise [44].
Our model specifies three levels of confidence that clas-
sifiers can have about the likelihood of re-identification,
with each pointing to a different tier - absolute confi-
dence, where no doubt is involved, strong confidence,
or weak confidence. Classifiers should give sufficient
thought to this question to ensure they are classifying data
to the appropriate sensitivity.
Commercial-in-confidence data is information which, if
disclosed, may result in damage to a party’s commercial
interest, intellectual property, or trade secrets.
4.3 Data ingress
The policies defined here minimise the number of people
who have access to restricted information before it is in
the secure research environment.
When a work package is fully classified, data will either
be ingressed from the initial Tier 3 environment to a new
analysis environment, or will stay in the original Tier 3
environment, depending on sensitivity. The web man-
agement workflows should ensure that all parties have
reached consensus on the classification tier at this stage
before allowing analysis to begin.
Initially, datasets should be transferred from the Dataset
Provider into a Tier 3 research environment once a Data
Sharing Agreement has been signed, and the executed
agreement is within the system. The workflows in the
web management framework should enforce the need for
this agreement to be reached before transfer.
The transfer process should be initiated by the Project
Manager in the management framework, opening a new
empty secure data volume (see section 5.5) for deposit.
The Investigator should authorise the mounting of the
data volume in the Tier 3 environment, using the web in-
terface.
After their dataset has been transferred, the Dataset
Provider Representative should immediately use the man-
agement framework to indicate that the transfer is com-
plete. In doing so, they lose access to the data volume.
Data should always be uploaded directly into the secure
volume to avoid the risk of individuals unintentionally re-
taining the dataset for longer than intended.
While open for deposit, this volume provides an addi-
tional risk of a third party accessing the dataset. We rec-
ommend that to deposit the dataset, a time limited or one-
time access token, providing write-only access to the se-
cure transfer volume, should be granted and transferred
via a secure channel to the Dataset Provider Representa-
tive.
The Project Manager may remind the Dataset Provider
Representative that this has been activated by a phone call
or email, but the details for access must only be provided
in the management framework, not over other channels,
to ensure only authorised personnel have access.
4.3.1 Non-internet data ingress.
If the Dataset Providers’ network bandwidth to the cloud
service is significantly worse than the research institu-
tions, or the data has not yet been digitised, then the data
may need to be provided to the research institution via a
physical medium. Protocols in this case are beyond the
scope of this paper.
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Figure 2. Flowchart describing questions for data tier selection for our recommendation of five tiers.
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4.3.2 Verification of integrity of transfer
The management system should make available, once the
transfer is complete, a hash of the deposited dataset. The
Dataset Provider Representative should then confirm to
the system that the hash matches a hash generated by the
Dataset Provider. If this is not the case, the Programme
Manager and the Project Manager must be alerted. This
integrity check may potentially be automated given the
appropriate choice of upload client and endpoint.
The management system should regularly automatically
re-verify the integrity of the dataset, and alert Programme
and Project Managers if the integrity is not maintained.
4.4 Data deletion and project closure
On completion of a project, following completion of the
reclassification or egress process for any data or pub-
lications generated, including those required by fun-
ders for long-term storage, the storage volumes (see
section 5.5) for all associated environments should be
deleted. (Archival preservation should be the subject of a
different system with different requirements.)
The project itself should remain in the system with meta-
data indicating its completion, and the list of environ-
ments and data volumes created retained.
5 The Analysis Environment
5.1 Software library distributions
Maintainers of shared research computing environments
face a difficult challenge in keeping research algorithm
libraries and platforms up to date - and in many cases
these conflict. While sophisticated tools to help with this
such as Spack [45] exist, the use of single-project virtual
environments opens another possibility: downloading the
software as needed for the project from package managers
such as the Python package index.
For Tier 1 and 0 environments, packages can be installed
directly from the appropriate official package server on
the public internet. However, to support on-demand pack-
age installation in Tier 2 and above environments, with-
out access to the external internet, requires maintenance
of mirrors of the official package repositories inside the
environment.
In addition to making a much wider range of pack-
ages available for some tiers, the use of package mir-
rors inside the environment means that the set of default
pre-installed packages on analysis machines can be kept
to a minimum, reducing the likelihood of encountering
package-conflict problems and saving on System Manager
time.
Malicious software has occasionally been able to become
an official download on official package mirror, including
the inclusion of addition of malicious code as accepted
contributions to existing open source projects. Defense in
depth means this is a low risk, since the environment will
not have access to the internet, but must still be guarded
against.
For Tier 2, we recommend maintaining a full mirror of
the official package server. To guard against "zero day"
exploits of popular packages, a short delay may be con-
sidered between a package being updated on the official
package server and being updated on the internal mirror.
However, extended delays in propagating updates to the
internal mirror risks security fixes remaining unavailable
long after they have been released on the official mirror.
An extended delay in updating the internal mirror also di-
minishes the usefulness of the packages available, as re-
searchers are often early adopters of new packages and
features.
For Tier 3, we recommend minimising the threat surface
from potentially malicious packages by only mirroring a
white-listed subset of the full package lists from the of-
ficial servers. It is feasible to perform a full indepen-
dent code review of all white-listed packages at this threat
level. Instead, we recommend this white-list be based on
easily auditable properties of packages, such as the size
of the developer and user communities, the availability of
source code, and the frequency of updates. We are work-
ing on a future publication of an automated model for
white-listing packages on the basis of information that can
be mined from package metadata and commit records.
5.2 Internal web services
Using the web browser and in programmatic connections,
users inside the environments should be able to connect
to local, protected instances of key internet services for
research, such as:
• Git, with service mirror of a git version control man-
agement tool such as Gitlab
• Collaborative paper-authoring tool such as HackMD
or Overleaf
• A local relational database such as PostgreSQL
5.3 Languages and tools
The environment must include the core tools of a profes-
sional data science programming environment. It would
not be fruitful to include the full list here, and such a list
would quickly age. However, we highlight critical ele-
ments of such an environment below:
• The R analysis environment [46], with package mir-
rors of CRAN and Bioconductor
• Python, with package mirrors of PyPI and Conda
• C, C++, and Fortran compilers, with a distribution
mirror for installing common packages, such as apt,
yum or chocolatey.
The following are also important, but less so than the
above to our user community:
• The Julia programming language and its packaging
system
• A JVM programming environment, with Java, Scala,
and Groovy and a mirror of Maven Central.
Page 14 of 23
PREPRINT ARTICLE - PRE-SUBMISSION For upload to arXiv.org
• .NET Core and Mono
Critical to the environment are the tools we use to develop
analyses:
• Programming text editors, such as vim, emacs, atom
and visual studio code
• Multi-language notebook programming interface,
such as Jupyter
• RStudio
• Command line scripting shell such as bash, with ac-
cess to the installed programming languages.
We note that the data scientists within the communities
we are targeting tend to prefer programming tools over
Excel, SPSS or Stata, so these do not form part of our
recommended list.
Although we recommend a minimal pre-installed list,
with most research software installed from package mir-
rors, machine learning toolboxes such as PyTorch and
Tensorflow can be problematic to configure oneself, so
pre-installing compiled instances of these tools these are
worthwhile.
5.4 At-scale computing
The environment must be able to scale to handle large
and complex datasets, so, within the management frame-
work for the environment, it must be possible to instanti-
ate multiple compute nodes, and small clusters.
Software must also be made available to access these
using both high-throughput and high-performance pro-
gramming tools, (at time of writing, including MPI and
Spark).
Multi- and many-core computing is also vital to modern
data science, so the environment must make available
many-core computing chips and the libraries to enable
this, such as cuDNN and OpenMP.
5.5 Storage
What storage volumes should exist in the analysis envi-
ronment?
A Secure Data Volume is a read-only volume that con-
tains the secure data for use in analyses. It is mounted
read-only in the analysis environments that must access
it. One or more such volumes will be mounted depending
on how many managed secure datasets the environment
has access to.
A Secure Document Volume contains electronically
signed copies of agreements between the Dataset Provider
and the research institution.
A Secure Scratch volume is a read-write volume used
for data analysis. Its contents must be automatically and
regularly deleted. Users can clean and transform the sen-
sitive data with their analysis scripts, and store the trans-
formed data here.
An Output volume is a read-write area intended for
the extraction of results, such as figures for publication.
See 4.1.5 below.
The Software volume is a read-only area which contains
software used for analysis.
A Home volume is a smaller read-write volume used for
local programming and configuration files. It should not
be used for data analysis outputs, though this is enforced
only in policy, not technically. Configuration files for soft-
ware in the software volume should point to the Home
volume.
6 The Management Framework
If badly constructed, the web-based management frame-
work described here might have access to make changes
to all the secure data volumes, and the identity man-
agement system (such as Active Directory) which defines
which users can access which datasets.
Compromise of this web application would therefore be
a serious security risk. We do not re-discuss here best
practices for secure web programming: we assume im-
plementers of this policy framework will follow these, and
will, in particular, commission penetration testing and se-
curity audit of the framework.
However, we discuss now some aspects of how this web
application should be designed in order to maintain secu-
rity.
The management application should access the software
defined infrastructure provision through the user creden-
tials of the user logged into it, rather than a separate ’ser-
vice user’ identity. It forms only a convenient interface to
powers that those same credentials could have wielded
if logged into the platform’s management portals directly.
Credentials are not stored with the application server, but
rather, proxied from the logged in user’s identity. For this
integration to be possible in a secure fashion, the platform
must expose its management capabilities through APIs se-
cured through the same login mechanism as used to ma-
nipulate them through its own management portals.
The primary management application, with its database
containing the IDs of the secure data volumes, should be
accessible only within the secure network, meaning it can
be accessed only from managed devices (see section 7.1).
However, certain processes need to be able to be carried
out through the management framework outside that net-
work, such as the ingress process carried out by a Dataset
Provider Representative, or the egress workflow for lower
tier environments. Therefore, a subset of views of this
application, only, may be made accessible via a restricted
proxy, outside the secure network.
For example, when the IP address range for an upload
process for data ingress is entered by the Programme or
Project Manager, the appropriate page containing infor-
mation for the Dataset Provider Representative will be
temporarily made available outside the secure network,
with firewall rules automatically set appropriately for the
duration of the ingress process.
7 Access to the system
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7.1 User Devices
What devices should Researchers use to connect to the
secure research environment?
Should a research institute restrict the access to install and
configure software on its researchers’ computers?
We note that this is perhaps one of the most controversial
and sensitive areas for research organisations. Scientists
and developers defend the devices on which they spend
their working lives with reasonable jealousy, and any se-
curity measures which cut into researcher productivity or
autonomy, or are perceived to, need to be carefully de-
fended.
We define two types of devices:
• Managed devices
• Open devices
It is not recommended that either kind of devices should
be used to analyse datasets containing sensitive informa-
tion - for handling sensitive data, researchers should use
these devices to connect to secure remote analysis envi-
ronments, as discussed below.
7.1.1 Managed Devices
Managed devices must, by default, when issued, not have
administrator/root access.
However, it is unlikely to be effective from either a cost
or productivity perspective to provide researchers with
a managed device solely for the purposes of connecting
to secure research environments, so the capability for
software-based research on these devices is therefore also
needed.
They should have an extensive suite of research software
installed.
This should include the ability to install packages for
standard programming environments without use of root
(such as pip install, brew install.)
Researchers should be able to compile and run executa-
bles they code in user space.
The setup should include a hypervisor for managing VMs
for activities that need root/administrator access.
7.1.2 Open Devices
Staff researchers and students should be able to choose
that an employer-supplied device should instead have an
administrator/root account to which they do have access.
These devices are needed by researchers who work on a
variety of bare-metal programming tasks.
However, such devices must not be able to access Tier 3
or 4 environments.
They may include personal devices such as researcher-
owned laptops.
When affordable, researchers may wish to choose a Man-
aged device for their desktop machine and an Open device
for their laptop.
7.2 Connections to the secure environment
How should Researchers connect to the remote analysis
environment?
7.2.1 Secure remote desktop
A secure remote desktop connection, allowing access to
graphical interface applications, should be provided to al-
low researchers to connect to the remote secure research
environment.
Our Azure reference implementation provides remote
desktop access via access nodes running Microsoft’s Re-
mote Desktop Services (RDS) web application, with
mandatory two-factor authentication. RDS permits func-
tionality such as disk and clipboard sharing between local
and remote machines to be configured on a per environ-
ment basis. This allows different controls on data ingress
and egress via the access nodes to be set for different tiers.
Alternative platforms such as Apache Guacamole provide
equivalent functionality.
For Tier 2 and above, our RDS access nodes are the only
parts of the secure research environment open to inbound
connections from outside the environment and do not per-
mit any disk, clipboard or device sharing between local
and remote machines.
7.2.2 Secure shell
Another key question here is the use of “secure shell” con-
nections.
Such text-based access is sufficient for some professional
data scientists, with the provenance information provided
by command-driven data analysis a primary driver for this
preference (processes can easily be reproduced based on
the commands typed.) When not needed, providing a
remote desktop interface adds complexity and therefore
risk.
However, command line access typically provides very
convenient ways for extraction of data files from remote
environments (scp, rsync), and for all kinds of addi-
tional services to be ’tunnelled’ through the SSH connec-
tion, opening many security holes. While we can for-
bid these by policy, their convenience makes workaround
breach likely, so they must be blocked technologically.
How, therefore, can we provide the command line user
experience for access to remote secure computing envi-
ronments while maintaining security? Casual, unthinking
copy-out can perhaps be equally mitigated by restricting
the capabilities of a remote shell, as by a remote desk-
top connection with copy-paste disabled. Complete pro-
tection from scripted screen-capture copy-out is equally
impossible in both cases.
Blocking commands, including those referred to above,
commonly used for data copy-out, is therefore a per-tier
configuration question. For detail on recommendations at
each tier, see section 11.
We note, however, that basic steps to provide for more
secure remote shell access should be implemented. At ev-
ery tier, secure passphrases (see section 5 of the NCSC’s
guidance [47]) or public key authentication should be en-
forced, with users trained in the use of key-chain man-
agers on their access devices, locked with two-factor au-
thentication, so that the inconvenience of repeatedly typ-
ing a long passphrase is mitigated, reducing the risk of
users choosing insecure passwords.
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If implementers choose to allow ssh access at higher
tiers, then specific commands, including those referred to
above, commonly used for data copy-out, must be forbid-
den to users. With these restrictions in place, we believe
that allowing secure shell access to analysis environments,
from managed devices on managed networks, can provide
equivalent risk of data copy-out to remote desktop access.
7.3 User device networks
Our recommended network security model requires re-
search organisations to create two dedicated research net-
works for user devices, in addition to the open internet:
• An Institutional network
• A Restricted network
An Institutional network corresponds to organisational
guest network access (such as Eduroam). Access to en-
vironments can be restricted such that access is only al-
lowed by devices which are connected to an approved In-
stitutional network, but it is assumed the whole research
community can access this network, though this access
may be remote for authorised users (for example, via
VPN). Restriction by IP address is possible on the Insti-
tutional network.
Remote access to an institutional network, e.g. via VPN,
may be permitted.
Access to a restricted Restricted network should be limited
to a physical space of a particular security level (see sec-
tion 7.4). Restricted networks therefore provide a way to
use restrictions on the IP ranges that can connect to higher
Tier environments to enforce physical security policies.
A Restricted network may be linked between multiple in-
stitutions (such as partner research institutions), so that
researchers travelling to collaborators’ sites will be able to
connect to Restricted networks, and thus to secure envi-
ronments, while away from their home institution.
Remote access to a Restricted network (e.g. via VPN)
should not be possible.
Firewall rules for the environments must enforce Re-
stricted network IP ranges corresponding to these net-
works.
Of course, environments themselves should, at some tiers,
be restricted from accessing anything outside an isolated
network for that secure environment.
7.4 Physical security
Some data requires a physical security layer around not
just the data centre, but the physical environment users
use to connect to it.
We distinguish three levels of physical security for re-
search spaces:
• Open research spaces
• Medium security research spaces
• High security research spaces
Open research spaces include university libraries, cafes
and common rooms.
Medium security research spaces control the possibility
of unauthorised viewing. Card access or other means of
restricting entry to only known researchers (such as the
signing in of guests on a known list) is required. Screen
adaptations or desk partitions can be adopted in open
plan environments if there is a high risk of “visual eaves-
dropping”. Screens must be locked when the user is away
from the device.
Secure research spaces control the possibility of the re-
searcher deliberately removing data. Devices will be
locked to appropriate desks, and neither enter nor leave
the space. Mobile devices should be removed before en-
tering, to block the ’photographic hole’, where mobile
phones are used to capture secure data from a screen.
Only researchers associated with a secure project should
have access to such a space.
Firewall rules for the environments must enforce Re-
stricted network IP ranges corresponding to these re-
search spaces.
8 User lifecycle
Having described the elements of a secure data science
research environment, we now describe our recommen-
dations for the processes which govern them.
Users who wish to have access to the environment should
create credentials within the upstream infrastructure pro-
vision service. This process will normally be managed
through the creation of the user accounts within an or-
ganisational directory, and these credentials will be prox-
ied by the management system.
Projects are created in the management system by a Pro-
gramme Manager, and an Investigator and Project Man-
ager assigned.
Programme Managers can assign users to all projects, and
can assign themselves as Project Managers. They add
users to groups corresponding to specific research projects
through the management framework. The Project Man-
ager has oversight over a particular project, and can as-
sign existing users to their project, but not invite new
users to the system as a whole - only Programme Man-
agers can do this.
At some tiers, new members of the research team or Ref-
erees must also be approved by the Dataset Provider Rep-
resentative (see 11).
Before joining a project, Researchers, Investigators and
Referees must receive training in handling data in the sys-
tem and certify this in the management system.
As required by law, the Dataset Provider Representa-
tive must also certify that the organisation providing the
dataset has permission from the dataset owner, and, in
relation to personal data, that the lawful basis for its col-
lection was not in itself consent, if they are not the dataset
owner, to share it with the research organisation, and
this should be recorded within the management system
database [27].
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9 Software Ingress
As discussed above, the base analysis machine provided
in the secure research environments should come with a
side range of common data science software pre-installed.
Package mirrors also allow access to a wide range of li-
braries, where package repositories are available for the
language and mirrors are provided by the environment.
For languages for which no package mirror is provided, or
for software which is not available from a package repos-
itory, an alternative method of software ingress must be
provided. This includes custom researcher-written code
not available via the package mirrors (e.g. code available
on a researcher’s personal or institutional Github reposi-
tories).
For Tier 0 and Tier 1 environments, the analysis machine
has outbound access to the internet and software can be
installed in the usual manner by either a normal user or
an administrator as required.
For Tier 2 environments and above, the following soft-
ware ingress options are available.
9.1 Installation during virtual machine deploy-
ment
Where requirements for additional software are known
in advance of an analysis machine being deployed to a se-
cure research environment, the additional software can be
installed during deployment. In this case, software instal-
lation is performed while the virtual machine is outside of
the environment with outbound internet access available,
but no access to any work package data. Once the addi-
tional software has been installed, the virtual machine is
ingressed to the environment.
9.2 Installation after virtual machine deploy-
ment
Once a machine has been deployed into an environment
and had access to the data within it, it is difficult to se-
curely and reliably move the machine out of the envi-
ronment while ensuring none of the data comes with it.
Therefore we recommend that analysis machines remain
with the environment once they have been deployed there
and are never moved out. As Environments at Tier 2 and
above do not have access to the internet, any additional
software required must therefore be brought into the En-
vironment in order to be installed.
Software is ingressed in a similar manner as data, using a
software ingress volume:
• In external mode the Researcher is provided tempo-
rary write-only access to the software ingress vol-
ume.
• Once the Researcher transfers the software source or
installation package to this volume, their access is re-
voked and the software is subject to a level of review
appropriate to the environment tier.
• Once any required review has been passed, the soft-
ware ingress volume is switched to internal mode,
where it is made available to Researchers within the
environment with read-only access.
For software that does not require administrative rights
to install, the Researcher can then install the software or
transfer the source to a version control repository within
the environment as appropriate.
For software that requires administrative rights to install,
the a System Manager must run the installation process.
10 Classification Review
Dataset Providers feel less acutely the productivity loss of
over-classification, and can attribute slow delivery to the
capabilities of the research team rather than the nature
of working in a secure environment. Researchers, con-
versely, shoulder less of the risk from under-classification.
Therefore, we recommend that an independent Referee is
consulted when classifying a work package which is likely
to be Tier 2 or above.
The Referee should classify the work package separately
to the research team and Dataset Provider(s). All parties
should agree on a classification in order to proceed.
This review should also take place at the point of data
egress, whether for further analysis or publication (at Tier
0). At the point of egress, Referees should be given access
to the Output Volume to check the data and the analysis
script, and they may ask for further clarification on the
script or the structure of the data. Access to the script is
an essential part of classifying derived data.
For review at declassification, some implementers may
wish to construct things so that the Referee can access
the environment with the Output Volume and Software
Volume mounted, but without the Secure Data Volume,
where a project does not wish to allow the Referee access
to the original data.
The Referee needs to be familiar with the classification
process outlined here, and particularly the important of
considering linked data in work packages during classi-
fication – the web framework should draw the Referee’s
attention to the salient literature on this topic.
Procedures for appointing a Referee are outlined below.
10.1 Referee college
We believe that a peer-based review system is critical to
the integrity of data classification. We therefore recom-
mend dedicating appropriate time and resource to estab-
lishing a pool of competent Referees who can support with
the classification process and procedures outlined above.
We recommend that a college of Referees is formed from
Investigators, Researchers or Programme Managers who
have access to the system. When Referees are needed for
specific reviews on project work, they can be drawn from
this college; for this reason the membership pool should
be deep enough that multiple projects can request Refer-
ees.
We believe that it would be most practical for Referees
to be drawn from this pool and assigned to particular
projects, as this can save time when classifying work pack-
ages containing repeat datasets with which the Referee
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will already be familiar. However, it would be possible to
assign Referees from the pool to individual tasks within
a project, and this would have the benefit of ensuring a
fresh perspective for each review.
Individuals making up the Referee pool must be:
• Familiar with the general principles of data handling
and classification
• Familiar with the specific classification process and
procedures
• Aware of the legal or financial consequences of incor-
rect classification
• Given permissions to access the project team’s data
despite not being part of the research team
A Referee working on a particular task or project must
be fully independent, in the sense that their interests are
not aligned with those of the project team. We appre-
ciate that a pool of Referees working with researchers in
the same institution will have connections to project team
members, so we assess that it is enough for the Referee to
have no immediate interest in the outcomes of the project
team’s work to be independent.
As is usual for peer-review pools, this is uncompensated
labour. We accept that it may be challenging to develop
this as a new norm; we hope that peer review, as is com-
mon place in academia for papers and grants, will become
part of the culture for sensitive data handling.
However, Referee pools will take time to grow. We rec-
ommend that Programme Managers within the institution
should be able to act as fall-back Referees if one is not
available in a timely fashion.
If a research organisation wishes to use a Referee who
isn’t employed there, they should establish a data process-
ing agreement with their home organisation and, where
required by the Dataset Provider, a confidentiality agree-
ment or security clearance. We see no problem with exter-
nal Referees, and while it will take more time to establish
a Referee pool that extends beyond one organisation, we
believe that this is a worthy aspiration.
In some cases, the Dataset Provider might appoint their
own Referee to review the derived data before it is ex-
tracted from the secure environment. We also see no is-
sue with this, though it is beyond the scope of this paper
to recommend procedures for ensuring independence in
the case of Dataset Provider-nominated Referees.
11 The choices
Having described the full model, processes, and lifecycles,
we can now enumerate the list of choices that can be made
for each environment. These should all be separately con-
figurable on an environment-by-environment basis. How-
ever, we recommend the following at each tier.
These are summarised in Figure 3.
11.1 Package mirrors
At Tier 3 and higher, package mirrors should include only
white-listed software.
At Tier 2, package mirrors should include all software, no
more than 6 weeks behind the reference package server.
Critical security updates should be fast-tracked.
At Tier 1 and Tier 0, installation should be from the ref-
erence package server on the external internet.
11.2 Inbound network
Only the Restricted network will be able to access Tier 3
and above access nodes.
Tier 2 environment access nodes should only be accessible
from an Institutional network.
Tier 1 and Tier 0 environments should be accessible from
the Internet.
11.3 Outbound network
At Tier 1 and 0 the internet is accessible from inside the
environment, at all other tiers the virtual network inside
the environment is completely isolated.
11.4 User devices
Open devices can access Tier 0,1 and 2.
Only managed devices can access Tiers 3 and 4.
Open devices should not be able to access the Restricted
network.
Managed laptop devices should be able to leave the phys-
ical office where the Restricted network exists, but should
have no access to Tier 3 or above environments while
‘roaming’.
11.5 Physical security
Tier 2 and below environments should not be subject to
physical security.
Tier 3 access should be from the medium security space.
Tier 4 access must be from the high security space (see
section 7.4).
11.6 User management
The Project Manager has the authority to add new mem-
bers to the research team, and the Project Manager has
the authority to assign Referees.
If researchers will be working on work packages at Tier
3 and above, they must also be counter-approved by the
Dataset Provider Representative, as should Referees who
will be reviewing work packages of this sensitivity.
11.7 Connection
At Tier 1 and Tier 0, ssh access to the environment is pos-
sible without restrictions. The user should be able to set
up port forwarding (ssh tunnel) and use this to access
remotely-running UI clients via a native client browser.
At Tier 2 and above, only remote desktop access is en-
abled.
We hope it will, in future, be possible to enable secure
shell access with two factor authentication and with the
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Figure 3. Table showing recommendations for the controls to be enacted at each tier.
most common copy-out commands blocked, at Tier 2, but
this remains unreliable with current technologies and we
cannot recommend it without further research.
11.8 Software ingress
At Tier 2 and above, additional software or virtual ma-
chines arriving through the software ingress process must
be reviewed and signed off by the Investigator before they
can be accessed inside the environment (with the excep-
tion of pre-approved virtual machines or package mir-
rors). At Tier 3 and higher, the Refeee should also sign
this off.
For Tier 0 and Tier 1, users should be able to install soft-
ware directly into the environment (in user space) from
the open internet.
11.9 Data ingress
All data should be ingressed initially into a Tier 3 environ-
ment, unless there is any suspicion that it might require
Tier 4.
After an initial review is conducted in the Tier 3 environ-
ment, follow the protocols in section 4.
11.10 Copy-paste
At Tier 1 and 0 copy-out should be permitted where a user
reasonably believes their local device is secure, with the
permission of the Investigator.
At Tier 2, copy-paste out of the secure research environ-
ment must be forbidden by policy, but not enforced by
configuration. Users must have to confirm they under-
stand and accept the policy on signup using the web man-
agement framework.
At Tiers 3 and 4, copy-paste is disabled on the remote
desktop.
11.11 Refereeing of classification
Independent Referee scrutiny of data classification is re-
quired when the initial classification by the Investigator
and Dataset Provider Representative is Tier 2 or higher
and for personal data which has been anonymised and is
classified as Tier 1 or Tier 0.
12 Summary of recommendations
We recommend that organisations building environments
for secure, productive data science research at scale:
• Build on top of a software-defined infrastructure ser-
vice
• Describe their entire infrastructure as a software de-
fined infrastructure
• Allow such scripts to construct an independent envi-
ronment for each project
• Define common security choices, that differ for dif-
ferent projects, using a configuration file interpreted
by those scripts.
• Provide a standard set of tiers, with a clear set of
questions used to determine the tier to which a re-
search activity should be allocated.
• Classify work packages rather than datasets, taking
into account the results of intended analysis and
dataset combination when assessing sensitivity.
• Include at least one intermediate tier for
pseudonymised or synthetic data, below that
used for identifiable personal data, and above that
used for non-personal data.
• Allow projects to use more than one environment, for
example, where data is generated warranting use of
a higher or lower tier in the course of a project.
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• Use an independent referee college to scrutinise clas-
sification decisions
• Use in-environment package mirrors to allow pro-
ductive import of research software libraries.
• Use an ‘airlock protocol’ to allow ingress of
researcher-written software
• Manage the associated business processes through a
web-based application, backed by a database
• Allow this application to drive the creation and man-
agement of environments and users in the software
defined infrastructure layer, using only forwarded
credentials.
13 Forthcoming work
In a future paper, we hope to present a reference imple-
mentation of a cloud data analysis environment based on
Microsoft Azure, compliant with these recommendations,
an open source fully scripted solution allowing organisa-
tions to implement these recommendations with minimal
effort.
A template Data Protection Impact Assessment to match
the paper’s model is in development.
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